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Comes now Appellants Michael Landes, Sidney Seftel and Theresa 
Seftel pursuant to the provisions of Rule t35, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and petitions the Court of Appeals for a rehearing 
of the above-referenced appeal. In support of said petition, 
Appellants respectfully submit the following: 
INTRODUCTION 
In rendering its decision affirming the trial court's grant 
of Summary Judgment, the Appellate Court acknowledged the two-step 
analysis required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(hereinafter "U.R.C.P.). However, notwithstanding the trial 
court's failure to undertake this two-step Analysis, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that, as a matter of laty, the Small Business 
Administration (hereinafter SBA) was not an indispensable party and 
the trial court's error was harmless. 
Appellants believe that in reaching this conclusion, the 
Appellate Court erred in its application of established legal 
precedent to the facts presented in the record on appeal. 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACTS WHICH TJHE COURT 
HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
1. The Court of Appeals failed to cbnsider or apply the 
analysis mandated by Rule 19(a) U.R.C.P., ^nd did not reach the 
ABB/ms 1 
question of whether the SBA was a necessary party to the litigation 
that could be joined. 
2. The Court of Appeals overlooked controlling legal 
precedent in ruling that a joint obligee can authorize another 
party to pursue its claim. 
3. The Court of Appeals misapprehended the effect of Capital 
City Bank's (hereinafter "Capital") status as a holder of the 
promissory note which other court's have considered irrelevant to 
an action to enforce an associated contract of guaranty. 
4. The Court of Appeals has overlooked established legal 
precedent regarding the enforcement of a guaranty by a party to the 
guaranty who is not also a party to an associated promissory note. 
5. The Court of Appeals has overlooked the fact that the 
record on appeal and all reasonable inferences from the facts 
presented in that record dictate the conclusion that the SBA is a 
participating lender as to ninety percent (90%) of the obligation 
and has an interest in any and all claims made under the contracts 
of guaranty. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO UNDERTAKE THE TWO 
STEP ANALYSIS REQUIRED BY RULE 19 IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE SBA WAS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY. 
While accepting Appellants' arguments concerning application 
of the factors presented under Rule 19, U.R.C.P., the Appellate 
Court's opinion outlines the two-step analysis mandated by that 
rule. That analysis begins with a determination of whether or not 
the absent party is a necessary party to the litigation. 
Subparagraph (a) of Rule 19, requires that a party who claims an 
interest in the subject matter of the actiqn must be joined as a 
party to the action if that person is subject to service of process 
and joinder of the party will not deprive the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Therefore, as a condition precedent tc any determination of 
whether or not a person is "indispensable" under Rule 19(b), a 
court must first determine the following: 
1. Whether the party in question 
the subject matter of the action and 
disposition of the action in his 
ability to protect that interest or 
of multiple or inconsistent obligations 
Iclaims an interest in 
is so situated that 
absence may impair his 
create a substantial risk 
2. Whether such a party is subject to service of 
process; and 
3. Whether joinder will deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 
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As the Appellate Court correctly noted, the trial court failed 
to address, let alone, make a determination on any of these 
factors. More importantly, the Appellate Court in deciding that 
the SBA was not an indispensable party has failed to undertake this 
mandatory analysis. 
From the Appellate Court's opinion, it appears that the 
initial question of whether the SBA was a necessary party that 
could be joined was completely overlooked. However, from the 
Appellate Court's conclusion that the SBA was not an indispensable 
party, it appears that the SBA was considered by the Court of 
Appeals to be a necessary party under rule 19(a) . It is clear that 
the issue of a party's status as indispensable does not have to be 
addressed until it is determined that the party is necessary. 
The SBA's status as a necessary party is supported by the 
record in this case. Specifically, the guaranty contracts name 
the SBA as a joint obligee with Capital, and as explained in the 
affidavit of M.A. Allem, "SBA is a participating lender in the loan 
of Capital City to Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%) 
of the outstanding unpaid balance." Therefore, the record reflects 
that the SBA has an interest in the subject matter of the action 
as a joint obligee.1 
xIn its opinion, the Court of Appeals recognized that as a 
general contract rule, joint obligees are deemed indispensable 
parties in a suit against an obligor and cites a number of cases 
that support that conclusion. As the Court explained; "joint 
obligees are ordinarily considered indispensable because 
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The facts which are actually supported by the record on appeal 
establish that the SBA does claim an interest relating to the 
subject matter of the action and dispositioh of the action in its 
absence may leave Defendants subject to d substantial risk of 
multiple or inconsistent obligations.2 
'[o]bligors have a "right to stand upon their contract and insist 
that they shall not be harassed with different actions or suits to 
recover parts of one single demand."'" (Opinion, p. 8) Implicit 
within these determinations are the conclusion that the joint 
obligees in those cases were necessary parties. 
following its determination that the SBA was not an 
indispensable party because it had authorized Capital to sue upon 
the note and guaranty, the Court of Appeals stated that so long as 
Capital is the holder of the note, as a matter of ordinary 
commercial law there is no obligation due under the note from Bagel 
Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, no underlying obligation of Bagel 
Nosh which the guarantors can be said to h^ve guaranteed to the 
SBA. This observation which appears to have 
the Court's determination that the SBA is 
party is contrary to accepted principals if guaranty law. An 
obligee's actions to enforce an absolute, unconditional guaranty 
of payment is distinct from any action to enforce the related 
promissory note. See United States v. McAllister, 661 F.Supp. 
indirectly influenced 
not an indispensable 
1175, 1177 (E.D. N.Y., 1987). As the I Court explained in 
McAllister, "this suit (to enforce a similar SBA guaranty) seeks 
recovery under the guaranty executed by the Defendants as 
individuals, not on the note executed by the corporate entity 
Peconic Bay. Nothing in Defendants' agreement conditions their 
liability on negotiation (to the SBA) of the note." Id., 661 
F.Supp at 1177. The Court of Appeals' dicta implies that because 
the SBA may not have loaned any monies to Bagel Nosh, the SBA gave 
no consideration for the guaranties and therefore cannot enforce 
them. While this position ignores the sworn statement of Mr. Allem 
that the SBA was a participating lender in the transaction, it also 
contradicts general principal of contract law which governs the 
enforcement of guaranties. See Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel, 701 
P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1985). The fact of from wljom the consideration 
flowed at the time the contract was executed is irrelevant to its 
enforcement by a named obligee on that guaranty. See Niederer v. 
Ferreira, 234 Cal. Rptr. 779, 790 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1987). 
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In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that Capital 
contends that the undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that 
the SBA has no legal interest in the guaranties. (Opinion, p. 8) 
Capital's contention is disingenuous. As the Court is aware from 
oral argument, subsequent to the trial court's entry of summary 
judgment, the SBA assigned its interest in the guaranties to 
Capital. Obviously in making this assignment, the SBA and Capital 
acknowledged its interest in the guarantees. In addition, there 
is nothing in the record which would support this "no legal 
interest" argument. 
The Court of Appeals also noted in its opinion that Capital 
argued on appeal that the SBA was not a party to the underlying 
note and had not funded any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh, 
(Opinion, p. 2) Again, there is nothing in the record to support 
the naked argument of counsel that the SBA had not funded any 
portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh.3 In direct contradiction to 
these contentions, at paragraph 3 of its Answer and Counterclaim, 
Capital states: 
"The Small Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA"), an 
agency of the United States of America, has an interest in the 
note and pursuant to Federal Law authorized Capital City to 
enter into the transaction with Bagel Nosh." 
3In should be remembered that arguments of counsel do not 
establish facts upon which summary judgment can be granted. See 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 609 F.Supp. 1174, 
1185 (D.C. 111. 1985). 
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Finally, the Court stated that Capital claims that the SBA has 
given Capital written authorization to s^e on the guaranties. 
(Opinion, p. 8) Mr. Allem's affidavit did establish that the SBA 
had given Capital written authorization to sue upon the note and 
guarantees. However, that is the only fact that is supported by 
the record on appeal and the only reasonable inference that can be 
drawn from that fact is that the SBA claims an interest in the 
litigation.4 This interest is such th^t it may leave the 
Defendants' subject to substantial risk of incurring double or 
inconstant obligations. 
Therefore, from the actual facts presented in the record on 
appeal, the inescapable conclusion is thdit the SBA should be 
considered as claiming the type of interest butlined in Rule 19(a) 
U.R.C.P.. Based on this record, the other factors presented in 
Rule 19(a), to wit, whether the SBA is subject to service of 
process or whether joinder would defeat th& jurisdiction of the 
court should have been analyzed by the trial court. This analysis 
did not take place. 
If the appropriate procedure is followed, it may result in 
the joinder of the SBA as a necessary party prior to any 
4In reviewing the granting of summary judgment the Court of 
Appeals must view the facts and all reasonably inferences therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the party contesting the motion. 
Brav Lines Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 115 (Utah App. 
1987). 
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determination of whether or not the SBA was indispensable. Failure 
to undertake this analysis constitutes reversible error and 
requires the Court to reconsider its decision.5 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE SBA IS NOT AN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTY BECAUSE IT AUTHORIZED 
CAPITAL TO SUE UPON THE NOTE AND GUARANTY 
IS CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING LEGAL PRECEDENT 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Allem's 
affidavit established that the SBA had given Capital written 
authorization to sue upon the note and guarantees "and thus, based 
on the undisputed facts before us is not an indispensable party." 
(Opinion, p. 8) Again, it should be noted that Capital's 
counterclaim sought enforcement of the guaranty contracts not the 
note and any reference to the note is irrelevant. See United 
States v. McAllister, 661 F.Supp. at 1177. 
As discussed above, the only fact relied upon by Capital which 
was established by the record on appeal was the existence of this 
written authorization. None of Capital City's other contentions 
mentioned in the opinion are supported by either Mr. Allem's 
affidavit or the record on appeal. 
^hile implicitly acknowledging that the SBA was a necessary 
party, the Court of Appeals has failed to recognize the impact of 
that conclusion. Instead, this Court seems to have assumed facts 
that are not supported by the record, to wit, that the SBA is not 
subject to service of process or its joinder will defeat the 
jurisdiction of the court below. Those conclusions are not 
supported by the record and therefore can not be relied upon by the 
Court of Appeals in rendering its decision. 
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Thus, the sole basis for the Court's conclusion that the SBA 
is notf as a matter of law, an indispensable party is the existence 
of this written authorization.6 What the Cburt is saying in this 
decision is that a joint obligee on a contract may authorize 
another obligee to pursue enforcement of the entire obligation 
created by the contract and thereby avoid tl}e operation of Rule 19 
and Rule 17, U.R.C.P.. This conclusion is contrary to fundamental 
principals of joinder and should be recons4dered by the Court of 
Appeals. 
It is a basic principal of law thajt an action must be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. As the Utah 
Supreme Court explained in Shurtleff v. Javi Tuff & Co., 622 P.2d 
1168, 1172 (Utah 1980): 
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted 
by the real party in interest to avoid further action on the 
same demand by another and to permit tfye Defendant to assert 
all defenses or counterclaims against the real owner of the 
cause. 
This right is not limited to original plaintiffs but must also 
be satisfied for purposes of asserting a counterclaim. First Sec. 
Bank of Glendive v. Gary, 718 P.2d 1345, 134[7 (Mont. 1986). 
6It should be noted that this authorization was not an 
assignment of the claim of the SBA's interest in the contract of 
guaranty. As the Court is aware, such an assignment was made after 
the judgment was entered. 
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As joint obligees, Capital and the SBA acted as defacto 
partners in relation to the transaction in question. Again, the 
record created by Mr. Allem's affidavit provides that the SBA was 
a participating lender in the loan of Capital to Bagel Nosh to the 
extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized that courts 
universally hold that an individual partner may not sue in his 
own name to enforce a liability owed to a partnership. Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984) As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Kemp: 
"One partner's failure to join all partners as plaintiffs 
is ground for dismissal for lack of necessary parties." 
(citing Rule 19(a) U.R.C.P.) Id. 680 P.2d at 759. 
In is clear in the present case that Capital is attempting to 
enforce claims held by itself and the SBA in its counterclaim 
against the Appellants. In fact the written authorization relied 
upon by the Court of Appeals in concluding that the SBA was not an 
indispensable party, evidences the fact that Capital was enforcing 
not only its claim but the claim of the SBA under the contracts of 
guaranty against Appellants. In essence the written authorization 
establishes that Capital was acting as the SBA's agent in enforcing 
the claims of the defacto partnership. 
It is well established that Appellants have a statutory right 
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to have all claims enforced against them ih the name of the real 
party in interest. See Shurtleff v. Jay Tiift & Co., 622 P.2d at 
1172. Yet, the Court's present opinion ijgnores that right and 
holds that by written authorization a claimant may empower its 
partner or agent to enforce their joint claims and therefore avoid 
being joined in the action or considered an indispensable party if 
joinder is unavailable. Such a conclusion lies in direct 
contradiction to the requirements of Rule 19 and Rule 17 and the 
basic protections embodied therein and establishes an unwarranted 
precedent.7 
CONCLUSION 
In reaching the conclusion that tt^ e SBA was not an 
indispensable party, as a matter of law, th^ Court of Appeals was 
required to determine that the SBA was a necessary party under Rule 
19(a), U.R.C.P.. Such a determination requires the Court remand 
the matter back to the District Court for analysis of the possible 
joinder of that party. The Court of Appeal's decision that a joint 
obligee may authorize another party to enforce its claims against 
mutual obligors contradicts establish rules of joinder and legal 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Kemp v. Murray, 680 
P.2d at 760; "Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same 
interests: judicial economy and fairness to the parties in 
litigation...Rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties who are 
present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims 
over the same subject matter as the original litigation. Rule 
17(a) serves essentially the same policy by rbouiring an action be 
brought by the real party in interest." 
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precedent issued by the Utah Supreme Court• That conclusion should 
be reconsidered by this Court in light of the conflicting 
precedent• 
Dated this ^ ^ day of January, 1989. 
^^^t^A—^t* 
Daniel W. Jackson 
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